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1 Decentralisation reform in Cambodia
Decentralisation reforms in Cambodia are a recent
development. It is only in 2001 that the commune
election law and the commune administration and
management law (hereafter referred to as the
commune law) were enacted. These two laws
provide the general framework for decentralised
governance at the commune1 level, the lowest of
the four-tier (i.e. national, province, district and
commune) administrative system in Cambodia.
Appointed governors govern the provinces and
districts,2 whereas elected commune councils
govern the 1,621 communes. In early February 2002,
954 women and 10,307 men were elected as
commune chiefs, first and second deputy chiefs and
as councillors. The size of the commune council (a
minimum of five persons, and increasing unevenly to
a maximum of 11) is a function of the population of
the commune, which may vary from as little as 200
inhabitants to as many as 80,000. The average
commune population is about 7,600 people.
The objectives of decentralisation reforms in
Cambodia, as stated by the government, are
threefold: to promote democracy and good
governance at the local level, to promote
participation in local social and economic
development, and to reduce poverty through
improvement of services and access to services.3 The
government’s commitment to the reforms was
reiterated and strengthened when, in July 2004, the
new government placed decentralisation and
deconcentration reforms, as part of good
governance, at the core of its ‘Rectangular Strategy’
for growth, employment, equity and efficiency. The
Prime Minister said:
The Royal Government recognizes that the
implementation of decentralisation to the
commune is crucial to the strengthening of
democracy at the grassroots level, improving the
quality of public services and participatory local
development in all sectors. A key priority in local
governance is to build local management capacity,
provide reasonable levels of financial resources to
the communes and promote the culture of
participation. Indeed, decentralisation must be
implemented in conjunction with deconcentration
to build capacity at the municipal, provincial, and
district levels, and thereby ensure harmonized and
mutually-supportive and complimentary operations
with and among the grassroots-level communities.
(Royal Government of Cambodia 2004)
The commune law gives broad powers to the
commune to govern ‘local affairs’ within its
territory, to meet the basic needs and serve the
common interests of commune residents. One of
the duties of the communes, based on their
authority to serve local affairs, is to ‘arrange
necessary public services and be responsible for the good
process of those affairs’ (Art. 43 of the commune
law). What the commune law does not specify –
nor any implementing regulation so far – is what are
the specific service functions the communes will be
responsible for, for example which functions in
health, education, water and sanitation, agriculture,
rural development or transport will be performed by
the communes?4 The commune law (Art. 44)
mentions that state authorities may delegate
powers (agency functions) to the commune,
together with capacity building and budgets, but as
of August 2006, only one agency function had been
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delegated to communes being the registration of
births, deaths and marriages.
A distinctive feature of the decentralisation reforms
in Cambodia, and one which partly explains the
substantial achievements of the reform after such a
short period of enactment of the laws, is that
Cambodia proceeded with legislation after
experimentation. The emergence of decentralisation
in Cambodia was not so much the transformation
from a political concept into a political reality, but
rather the acceptance and endorsement of an actual
reality at sub-national levels, which increasingly came
to the attention of politicians at the national level.
Since 1996, Cambodia has implemented a
programme which was a policy experiment in
decentralised local development planning, financing
and management.5 Through this programme – which
started in 1996 with a coverage of 43 communes in
five provinces and gradually expanded to reach full
coverage to all 1,621 communes in the 24 provinces
by April 2003 – a set of systems, procedures and
supporting structures were developed (and often
revised), which have substantially shaped the systems,
procedures and structures of the decentralisation
reform in Cambodia.
Such experimentation and learning-by-doing at
commune, district and provincial level helped to
ensure that many features of decentralisation in
Cambodia had already proven their workability
before they became enshrined into law and
regulations. The learning-by-doing approach also
meant that the communes and provincial
departments were given small amounts of
discretionary money to implement projects they had
selected themselves right from the start. The
orthodox approach would have been to identify
functional assignments which the sub-national levels
could or should handle, build up their capacity to do
so, and then provide them with the funds they need
for this. The unorthodox approach followed gave the
sub-national levels some money straight away, and
by using this money, and building up the capacity to
use it effectively and transparently at the same time,
commenced a virtuous cycle of learning-by-doing.
2 Innovative features of Cambodia’s
decentralisation design and practice
The decentralisation reform in Cambodia has several
innovative features which were not part of the
country’s administrative system before, and which
potentially help to position the communes better to
achieve poverty reduction through improved service
delivery. While the scope of this article does not
permit us to cover all innovative features in the
commune governance systems, we wish to highlight
three systems in particular: the finance system, the
development planning system and the support system.
3 The commune finance system
As part of the decentralisation reforms, the
government established a Commune Fund to
transfer state and other resources to the communes.
The purposes of the Commune Fund, as stated in the
Commune Fund sub-decree (Art. 2) are:
? To enable the communes to assume their general
responsibilities for local administration and
promotion of local development in accordance
with the provisions of the commune law
? To reduce differences in the relative potential of
the communes to mobilise their own revenue,
because of different demographic, social and
economic conditions
? To act as an incentive for building the capacity for
good governance of the commune councils.
To date (mid-2006), regulations for own-source
revenue of communes have not been developed and
the communes are thus totally reliant upon the
intergovernmental fiscal transfer. In addition, there
has been no development on the use of the
Commune Fund as a capacity development incentive.
The Commune Fund can be resourced from central
government resources as a percentage of total
domestic revenues, from donor funds (either loans or
grants) and from other sources of revenue to the
communes. The possibility that the Commune Fund
can be capitalised from donor funds is important and
innovative. It avoids the proliferation of parallel
funding systems by different donors, each with
different reporting requirements, but instead helps
to strengthen the emergence of a common fund
transfer mechanism, and gives the government an
instrument to somewhat equalise donor support to
communes. As an illustration, the 2006 Commune
Fund allocation amounts to almost US$19 million, of
which nearly US$17 million is contributed by the
government, and US$2 million by DFID (Department
for International Development), SIDA (Swedish
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International Development Cooperation Agency) and
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme).6
The government contribution includes an estimated
US$6 million from a World Bank loan.
The design of the commune finance system fosters
predictability from the resource flow to the
communes, and clearly defines what part of a
commune’s allocation may be used for general
administration (not more than one-third) and what
part needs to be used for local development (not less
than two-thirds). Unspent funds from administration
can be transferred to the development budget, but
not the other way around.7 The overall level of
central government resources allocated to the
Commune Fund is determined for a period of three
years in advance, so the communes have a clear idea
of what level of support they may expect from the
state. This was intended to be a yearly update of a
three-year projection of the percentage of domestic
revenues to be allocated to the Commune Fund. In
practice, there have only been two three-year
predictions so far. The first time in 2002, which
established that in the first three years of its
operation, the government contribution to the
Commune Fund would be Cambodian Riel 20 billion
(US$5 million) in 2002, no less than 2 per cent of
recurrent revenues in 2003, and no less than 2.5 per
cent in 2004. The second announcement was made
in mid-2004, which established the percentage of
2.52 per cent for 2005, 2.54 per cent for 2006 and
2.56 per cent for 2007.
These percentages indicate that the amount of
resources allocated to the Commune Fund (averaging
US$1.5 per capita in 2006) is small by international
standards. This parsimony, and the levelling off of the
percentages of the government contribution to the
Commune Fund, raise doubts as to what extent the
government seriously pursues its stated objectives of
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Table 1 Proposed categorisation of commune expenditures
Recurrent expenditures Investment expenditures
General ?Allowances to councillors
administration ? Salaries of local staff and other personnel 
expenses
? Rental of office premises
? Routine repair and maintenance of
administrative facilities
?Utility charges
? Fuel, lubricants and vehicle maintenance
?Other consumables and miscellaneous 
The survey, design, construction, and major
repair and maintenance of:
? roads, bridges
?markets
? educational and healthcare facilities 
community centres, irrigation networks 
and structures, agricultural storage
facilities
?water and power supply
? other economic and social infrastructure
Source Romeo 2001.
? Purchase of council's premises
?Major repair and maintenance of
administrative facilities
? Furniture and office equipment for the 
council's or administration's facilities
? Purchase or rental of vehicles
? Personnel and other recurrent costs 
associated with the operation of the local
infrastructure and the delivery of related 
services
? Support of community development 
programmes managed by local NGOs and 
community-based organisations, including 
local education and information campaigns 
for women and youth, environmental 
protection and natural resources 
management and other programmes 
impacting on the welfare of the local 
population
? Routine maintenance of local economic
and social infrastructure
Local 
development 
the decentralisation reforms. It also raises the
question whether the actual (unstated) objective was
not first and foremost political decentralisation, with
little intent to vigorously pursue real service delivery
by, and delegation of functions to, the communes.
The predictability of the overall resources is matched
by a broad predictability and transparency in the
allocation of resources to the communes. Less than
one-third of the total Commune Fund allocation is
earmarked for general administration, and is
allocated to all communes in proportion to the
number of councillors they have. At least two-thirds
of the Commune Fund is allocated in support of
local development annually. This clear delineation in
the use of the Commune Fund avoids safeguards
against the commune councils spending the bulk of
available development funds on improvement of
administrative facilities, at the expense of serving the
development needs of the local population.
The calculation of the allocations to individual
communes for local development is achieved
through a distribution formula, which takes the
following three factors into account:
? A base allocation (amounting to 35 per cent of
the total Commune Fund allocation for 2005)
evenly divided between all communes
? A population factor (amounting to 35 per cent)
based on the number of commune councillors as
a proxy for the population
? A poverty-related factor (amounting to 30 per
cent) based on a compounded poverty indicator.
The allocations for general administration and local
development to the communes are publicly
announced, and all communes in a province are
aware of how much each of them receives.
In the design of the finance system (Romeo 2001), it
was proposed to have a clear distinction between
recurrent expenditures and investment expenditures,
for both general administration and local
development, as indicated in Table 1.
This categorisation would have allowed the commune
to use its local development funding to finance either
local infrastructure development or the delivery of
services, reflecting that both infrastructure and delivery
of services requires capital investments and funding to
cover operational or recurrent expenditures.
Unfortunately, this clear separation between recurrent
expenditures and investment expenditures for both
administration and local development did not appear
in the regulation for the finance system, where the
two types of expenditures for general administration
and local development were combined and
mentioned as ‘recurrent and investment expenditures’
(NCSC 2002). What made matters worse was that
the capital revenues (which almost exclusively consist
of the local development component of the
Commune Fund) were restricted to financing
investment expenditures, while the recurrent revenues
(which consist of the administration component of the
Commune Fund and little else as the communes have
not yet been empowered to raise own source
revenues) were expected to cover all recurrent
expenditures. As a consequence, the top-right and
bottom-left cells in Table 1 had little or no funding,
which is particularly important for local service
delivery, and its operation and maintenance.
Measures have since been taken to redress the
situation (MEF 2003), but it treats the use of local
development funds for service delivery as an allowable
exception of the general rule that the Commune Fund
supports small-scale local infrastructure, rather than as
a legitimate use of the funds in their own right. The
financing of local delivery of services, while possible in
principle, rarely occurs.
4 The commune development planning system
Planning for local development, if it is to be
meaningful, needs to be done with the predictability
of known and available resources to implement the
selected priority activities. If planning is done without
such knowledge, it quickly degenerates into the
production of extended ‘wish lists’ of potential
projects that stand little chance of ever being
implemented. As indicated above, the information
on the commune’s allocation from the Commune
Fund, which is normally announced some two to
three months before the start of the fiscal year,
helps to make planning meaningful. It should also be
noted that the regulatory framework states that the
communes are to be provided with the Commune
Fund figures for three years in advance.
In 2002, every commune prepared a five-year
commune development plan, and in the years
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2003–6, they prepared updated three-year rolling
commune investment programmes. The preparation
of the commune development plan and the
commune investment programmes follows an 11-step
planning process of which the first two steps are
participatory needs assessments at village and
commune levels. At the end of the planning and
budgeting process, the commune council submits its
commune development plan or programme and its
budget for the next year to the provincial authorities
for legality checks. The important aspect here is that
the communes do plan against known and secure
resources and not merely draw up a wish list of
potential development activities.
To ensure broader participation in the development
planning beyond the 5–11-person commune council, a
planning and budgeting committee assists the
council in preparing the development plan, annual
investment programme and budget. Each village in
the commune, of which there are on average eight,
has in principal at least two representatives on the
planning and budgeting committee, one man and
one woman. This helps to ensure that conditions
exist for women to voice their concerns and needs in
the planning process (although it must be admitted
that a woman’s presence by itself does not
automatically result in gender-responsive local
development planning).
Cambodia’s decentralisation system promotes
participatory governance but there are no
consultative mechanisms in place that enable the
poor to voice their interests beyond their
participation in the commune development planning
process. This offers them no guarantees that the
budget which the commune council submits to the
provincial authorities will include activities that will
benefit them proportionally more than the better-
off commune residents. An interesting approach,
which is being piloted in a few provinces, is the
participatory identification of the most vulnerable
families in the commune (GTZ 2004). This
information has been of benefit in two ways. It has
resulted in some commune councils selecting
development activities which specifically benefit poor
rather than less-poor commune residents, as well as
informing some provincial departments, and other
service providers, to use this most vulnerable families
list for selecting the households which should receive
first priority for the services they offer.
Another innovative aspect of the commune
development planning process in Cambodia –
especially from the perspective of strengthening
commune level services delivery and accountability –
are the District Integration Workshops. These
workshops take either half a day or one full day, and
are held in each of the 185 districts, between mid-
September and mid-November. The workshops are
attended by between three and five representatives
of each commune (of which at least one should be a
woman); representatives of provincial departments
of line ministries (quite often the heads of
departments) and their district staff; and
representatives of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and international organisations working in
the district. The main objective of the workshop is to
achieve better alignment and integration of the
development plans of provincial departments, NGOs
and other agencies, and those of the communes
themselves. Commune representatives negotiate
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Table 2 District Integration Workshop results (2002–5)
Year No of No of temporary agreements % responsiveness 
commune to high priority 
high priority Government departments NGOs and private donors commune
requests requests
Matching high Not matching Matching high Not matching 
priority high priority priority high priority 
commune commune commune commune 
requests requests requests requests
2002 41,745 8,953 10,690 3,451 7,273 30
2003 37,936 8,514 13,100 4,373 6,744 34
2004 44,999 7,520 14,087 4,606 11,332 27
2005 43,330 8,290 13,590 4,085 10,229 29
potential support for their communes with other
parties, and such agreements for support and/or
collaboration are formalised as temporary
agreements (‘temporary’ not because the possibility
of funding is uncertain, but because the projects and
activities that are the focus of the agreements may
still have to undergo a feasibility and detailed cost
study, to confirm that the actual costs remains
within the budget limitations).
The majority of high-priority commune requests8 are
for construction, repair or rehabilitation of physical
infrastructure and the provision of equipment and
material inputs. The emphasis on basic infrastructure
is understandable, as most communes perceive
inadequate facilities and reduced accessibility as the
greatest constraints to local economic development
and the better delivery of health, education and
other services. Communes frequently also request
services and in-service training programmes, which
they know provincial departments and donor-
supported programmes can deliver (such as posting
and training of teachers, vaccination campaigns,
support to village veterinarians, clearing of landmines
and the regularisation of property rights through
land titling). Requests for general education and
vocational training activities are also quite common.
Table 2 gives the results of the District Integration
Workshops during 2002–5 for the whole country. It
shows the number of temporary agreements that
were signed by government departments, NGOs
and private donors for activities or projects that
match high priority requests from the communes;
and for activities or projects that did not match
commune high priority requests but were instead
proposed by the government departments, NGOs or
private donors themselves.
On average, nearly one-third of the commune
requests receive positive responses, however it should
be noted that this high percentage is to a large extent
because the provincial departments receive donor
funds for investment, which they are expected to
allocate in response to commune requests. The ability
of provincial departments to respond to commune
requests, and integrate local demands in their own
sector planning process and with the national budget,
is still very limited, if not impossible. It is constrained
by the lack of deconcentration and provincial
autonomy in programming national sector resources,
and by the limited resources available for provincial
level planning and budgeting. The linkages which are
forged between the commune plans and sector plans
are thus still largely induced by the availability of
donor funding, rather than through the commitment
of government funding from the national ministries.
One other aspect of the temporary agreements is
worth noting. The temporary agreements also play a
key role in strengthening accountability. At the
workshops, the communes can publicly question
provincial departments or NGOs, and ask them to
account for temporary agreements they signed with
the communes in the previous year but which they
did not honour. Such questioning of provincial
departments or NGOs by communes is quite a role
reversal.
The main criticism against the commune development
planning system is that it is too time consuming, when
compared with the small amount of resources which
the communes have to finance local development. The
fact that the communes – and all the villages in the
commune – are expected to do a yearly update of
their development needs in a participatory manner is
also seen by some as excessive planning, as conditions
and development needs are unlikely to have changed
very much in one year.
5 The decentralisation support system
Support for decentralisation is provided by the
national, the provincial and the district level. At
national level, a National Committee for Support to
Communes/Sangkats (NCSC) was created to facilitate
the implementation of the commune law, together
with the establishment of a Department of Local
Administration in the Ministry of Interior, and a
Department of Local Finance in the Ministry of
Economy and Finance (the latter is meant to be the
secretariat for the – still to be established –
Commune Fund Board).
In each province, support for decentralisation is
provided through a combination of government
support and donor support. On the government side,
there is the Provincial Local Administration Unit
(linked to the Provincial Governor’s Office), and a
Contract Administration Unit, a Technical Support
Unit and a Finance Unit of a Provincial Rural
Development Committee. This committee, headed
by the Provincial Governor, manages and coordinates
the support for decentralisation. The staff in all these
units are civil servants, who receive monthly salary
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supplements to complement their meagre wages. In
every province, there is also a team of donor-
supported advisers who advise and/or assist the staff
of the above-mentioned units, and of various
provincial departments, to implement programmes
and projects in support of decentralisation.
District-based or assigned facilitators of the Local
Administration and the Technical Support Units
interact most actively with the communes and the
appointed commune clerk. They are the most
important – but unfortunately often also the
weakest – link in the support and supervision and
capacity building9 to the communes for development
planning and project implementation, and other
tasks that already have been assigned to the
communes (such as civil registration and reporting).
Notwithstanding their relative weakness, without
the support of facilitators and technical support staff,
the achievements of the communes after four years
of decentralisation would be much smaller than they
are now.
The main constraint against the support structure at
sub-national levels is that it is reliant on donor
support to pay the salary supplements. The issue of
salary supplements will be addressed through the
public finance management reforms.
To summarise, it can be said that the commune finance
system, the commune development planning system
and the decentralisation support system potentially
enable the communes to engage in poverty reduction
activities at the local level, but the lack of functional
assignments, scarcity of resources and the limited
capacity of both commune councillors and facilitators,
somewhat limits the realisation of this objective.
6 Investments and service delivery at 
commune level
6.1 Commune Fund projects during 2002–4
Over the period 2002–4, the communes invested
nearly US$20.8 million of their Commune Funds in
local development. Table 3 shows the number of
projects for various project types, and the amount of
funding for each of these. It shows that nearly all
funding was used to finance small-scale civil works.
Over the three-year period, 66 per cent of the total
has been spent on transport projects, involving the
construction, improvement and/or repair of roads,
small bridges and culverts. Together with the money
spent on irrigation, drainage and flood protection,
some 82 per cent of the local development funding
available to the communes has been spent on
economic infrastructure. Social infrastructure
investments (covering water supply, and the
construction and repair of educational and health
facilities) amounted to 17 per cent of the total.
It is estimated that in 2003, some 880,000
households, representing 4.7 million people in 5,630
villages (roughly one-third of the total population)
benefited from these commune projects (NCSC 2004).
7 Obstacles to service delivery at commune level
Service delivery at commune level can occur in two
forms. First, there are the services that can be
delivered by the commune council itself, or which
the council contracts from a third party. These can be
services which the commune has selected on its own
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Table 3 Commune Fund use by project type (2002–4)
Type of project 2002 2003 2004 Total
Projects Amount Projects Amount Projects Amount Projects Amount 
(n) (US$) (n) (US$) (n) (US$) (n) (US$)
Transport 422 2,388,153 1,189 5,156,081 1,139 6,102,571 2,750 13,646,804
Water supply 164 606,314 261 799,404 152 600,322 577 2,006,041
Education 65 475,017 92 584,435 74 519,688 231 1,579,140
Irrigation 69 312,570 329 1,201,967 324 1,592,657 722 3,107,194
Health 2 1,916 7 22,043 3 6,945 12 30,904
Drainage and 
flood protection 0 0 49 114,254 39 249,575 88 363,830
Other 6 18,840 12 31,031 8 15,646 26 65,517
Total 728 3,802,810 1,939 7,909,215 1,739 9,087,404 4,406 20,799,430
initiative, or they can be mandated agency functions.
Second, it can be a service which is delivered
through a line department or an NGO.
Service delivery by the communes themselves has
been limited for the following reasons:
? As stated above, most communes see lack of
infrastructure as the main constraint for local
development and accessibility to services.
Construction or repair of facilities is therefore
preferred over funding of recurrent expenditures
for delivery of services
? During the first three years, the capacity building
and familiarisation of commune councillors with
budgeting and implementation procedures of
commune projects has mostly focused on
infrastructure development. This may have kept
some communes from selecting other types of
projects
? There are as yet no clearly defined responsibilities
for minimum service delivery, nor is there any
specification of a minimum percentage of local
development funds that needs to be allocated for
local development recurrent expenditures.
Contracting of infrastructure is an easier and a
more visible expression of commune council
activity than the contracting of services (especially
when considering re-election)
? The delegation of agency functions for basic services
(with corresponding resources and support) to the
commune councils has hardly happened, primarily
because the ministries have barely started to identify
which agency functions the commune councils
could deliver more effectively than under the
current delivery arrangements. Even if suitable
agency functions for communes have already been
identified, the budgetary uncertainties might not
guarantee that the communes would receive the
resources to implement these.
It also needs to be said that promoting the allocation
of development funds for non-infrastructure projects
may not necessarily yield the best value for money.
With 30 per cent of the communes having a
population of less than 5,000, many communes may
be too small to deliver services effectively. One of
the working groups of the NCSC is responsible for
reviewing the commune boundaries, and to
determine the viability of communes as service
delivery units, but the working group has barely met
and not produced any outputs so far.
Service delivery through deconcentration to
provincial or district offices of line ministries is also
hindered by the fact that sector budgets in
Cambodia are highly centralised, with little
deconcentration to provinces. On average, 80 per
cent of the provincial budget is allocated through
national line ministry budgets and Priority Action
Programmes, but with limited discretion for the
provinces on how this is spent. In 2003, close to
60 per cent of these budgets was needed to cover
salaries, with another 20 per cent for operations,
leaving 20 per cent for other expenditures, which is
not enough for provincial departments to enable
them to fulfil their mandate in a meaningful manner
(Bartholomew and Betley 2004).
There is often also a gap between the budget and
the actual releases. The Priority Action Programme
for health, for instance, in 2002 only received 53 per
cent of the planned national priority funds and
80 per cent of the planned provincial priority funds,
while in 2003, this deteriorated to 37 per cent and
56 per cent, respectively. In the current mode of
operation, the budget system of the provincial
governor’s office, as well as the provincial level
national budgets, do not give appropriate incentives
for accountability for the provision of priority, locally
based services to the local population (Bartholomew
and Betley 2004: 31).
In April 2005, the government presented an overall
vision for decentralisation and deconcentration
reforms in Cambodia (RGC 2005) but many
important aspects are still unclear. One important, as
yet unresolved, issue is whether deconcentration will
primarily happen through the transfer of a larger
share of sectoral ministry budgets at national level to
their provincial departments, or whether the national
budget allocation to sector ministries will be reduced,
and be compensated for by an increased transfer of
resources to the provincial authorities, who will then
allocate these to the provincial departments.
8 Conclusion
Cambodia has made progress in the past few years in
developing a multi-level government system,
particularly with respect to the elected commune/
sangkat council system. The progress is noteworthy
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given Cambodia’s historically heavy centralisation,
extreme poverty, and institutional weakness. Many
features of the commune/sangkat system have been
defined on the basis of international experience and
lessons from in-country experiments with
decentralised development (Smoke 2003).
Decentralisation in Cambodia has started prudently,
with the communes being given a limited amount of
funding to cover administrative and local
development expenses. Through experience gained
from implementation of small-scale infrastructure
projects and a few limited administrative functions,
and with the support of district-based facilitators,
the commune councils have become more
prominent players at the local level. Decentralisation
has also brought with it a more participative and
democratic approach to commune governance than
before, and the ability of the commune councils to
provide services and local development – albeit
rather limited at this moment – helps them to gain
political credibility vis-à-vis their local constituency.
Service delivery for such areas as education and
health, which are often the remit of local
governments, are not yet being provided by the
Cambodian communes, largely because the scope of
commune involvement in such services – and more
importantly the mechanisms for service provision and
the resources needed for this – has not been agreed
upon by the concerned ministries.
Meaningful decentralisation hinges on the
communes having adequate resources. For most
communes, the intergovernmental transfer system
will remain the main source of funding, but new
sources of local revenue will become increasingly
important to help finance the costs of commune
service delivery. Such ‘own’ sources of revenue
further strengthen the connection of the commune
councils to their constituents, and offers the
prospect for improved resource allocation. A gradual
and pragmatic approach to increase the responsibility
for service delivery by commune councils can
contribute significantly to local poverty alleviation, if
it is implemented in parallel with broader public
sector reforms. However, if these further initiatives
do not progress, it is difficult to see substantive
decentralised rewards and outcomes beyond the
political domain.
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Notes
1 The two laws apply to communes, which are
located in provinces, and to sangkats, which are
the equivalent of communes in a municipality. In
the text we use the term ‘commune’ to refer to
both the commune and the sangkat.
2 For the sake of expediency, and as there is as yet
no differentiation of powers or functions between
provinces and municipalities, we use the term
‘province’ as shorthand for both provinces and
municipalities, and ‘district’ for both a rural district
as well as its municipal equivalent, the khan.
3 A less clearly stated objective but one which was
probably also on the mind of the political parties,
is that the commune council election of February
2002 would help to rejuvenate and expand their
political basis in the communes for the central
party, in preparation for the national election of
July 2003. However, this effort to strengthen the
political dimensions of decentralisation has been
at the cost of paying less attention to capacity
development, administrative aspects and service
delivery through sectors.
4 It is worth noting, however, that the long-
awaited Organic Law (on sub-national
governance) is meant to designate sector
functional assignments. As of September 2006, a
draft of the proposed law was only available for
internal review within the government.
5 For more information on this programme, known
as the ‘Seila Programme’, see www.seila.gov.kh
6 In 2006, another US$3 million is added to this
from donors, e.g. IFAD, Danida, UNICEF and
Concern. These funds are allocated in support of
development at the commune level, using the
implementation mechanisms agreed for the
Commune Fund projects, but with the money
being disposed directly into the commune
accounts, without being incorporated into the
Commune Fund.
7 The likelihood of this happening is virtually nil,
since the salaries that have been awarded to
commune councillors are quite substantial
compared with the salaries of civil servants, and
the total of these salaries exceeds the one-third
of the current Commune Fund total. Only part of
these salaries’ expenses is therefore provided
through the Commune Fund. The remainder
comes from the provincial budget line which was
used when commune chiefs were still Ministry of
Interior employees, before the 2002 election
(Smoke 2003: 40).
8 The communes are asked to submit only their high
priority requests for discussions with line
departments and NGOs at the District Integration
Workshops. The high priority requests should
make up about one-third of all commune
requests, the other being medium and low
priority.
9 In 2002–4, there has been an extensive
programme of capacity building to all commune
councils, primarily to enable them to plan, budget
and implement projects and governance tasks
effectively. There is currently a shift from across-
the-board training to more targeted and in-
response-to-needs training.
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